Sudanese-Ethiopian border conflict is Egypt's Gain (7)

 "If you search for the cause of every problem, you find the GERD behind each of them" 

— Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopian Prime Minister

Disputed border between Sudan and Ethiopia (Source: The Economist) 

As established throughout this blog series, Sudan and Ethiopia have had a complicated and at times hostile relationship. The relationship between these two states is crucially important amid the backdrop of negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Thus, the current conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashaga, a disputed strip of fertile farm land between the two nations, has serious implications for the future of water negotiation in the Nile River Basin.  As argued in earlier posts, the greatest winner from a Sudanese-Ethiopian conflict is Egypt, whose power in the region relies on the instability of other states. In this post, I provide a brief summary of the border conflict, the Tigray War, and the implications of instability on the future of water access in the Nile River Basin.

The Sudanese-Ethiopian conflict stems from (as so many conflicts in the Nile River Basin do) a centuries-old treaty signed by the British with Ethiopia allotting al-Fashaga to Sudan (Swain, 1997). Ethiopia has long contested this allocation; eventually, in 2008, a deal was reached between former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir and late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi allowing Ethiopian farmers to work the land of al-Fashaga, provided they recognize Sudanese ownership of the area. That fragile deal lasted until 2021, when war broke out in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (see map). 

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the governing party of the Tigray region, dominated Ethiopian politics prior to being sidelined by Abiy. Shortly after Abiy rose to power, conflict broke out, which has escalated into a full-blown civil war receiving blanket condemnation from the international community and humanitarian organizations. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed requested that the Sudanese seal the border to prevent Tigray rebels from smuggling supplies, and in response Sudan expelled thousands of Ethiopian farmers in al-Fashaga. Ethiopian officials responded by accusing Sudan of an invasion of Ethiopia and moved troops in to reinforce the border along with reinforcements from neighbouring Eritrea. 

Today, Sudan appears to be the victor of the conflict, successfully securing their border while also displaying Ahmed's relative weakness in his own country. Many refugees from the Tigray region have fled to Sudan, putting further resource pressure on the country while also increasing Sudan's position in water negotiations. As stated by the UN, a 'humanitarian disaster' is unfolding in Ethiopia. If further consequences are given to Ethiopia, in the form of sanctions or otherwise, it threatens to isolate the country at a crucial time when its fragile politics could take a turn for the worse amid fears of ethnic cleansing, reports of civilian killings, sexual assault, and famine. As mentioned in my earlier post on Egyptian hydro-hegemony, Egyptian dominance of the region relies on the relative weakness of its neighboring states. Egypt could further the instability in Ethiopia by aiding rebels thereby igniting a proxy war over the GERD. 

The GERD represents Ethiopia's attempts to control its own destiny in a region marked by political instability, but the volatility that has prevented Ethiopia from developing the infrastructure and capacity to make serious withdrawals from the Nile thus far is rearing its head again, threatening to set back Ethiopia and thus the rest of the region once again.