Power shifting upstream? Sudan's place in the Nile River Basin (5)

 

British decolonisation in Africa. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Hello! We spent last week summarizing some of the transboundary politics surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. At the suggestion of a kind commenter on that post, we will focus this week's blog reflecting on Sudan's role within the Nile River Basin. Last week's post characterized Sudan as a 'little brother' of Egypt as far as its impact and political agency within the basin. This characterization is overly simplistic, and taking a closer look will allow us to unpack some of the complex politics surrounding the state. As will be established in this post, Sudan's strategic position as a "midstream" state and its increasing capacity for withdrawal threatens Egypt's dominance in the region and shifts power toward Ethiopia. Understanding the role that Sudan plays in the region requires engagement with many previously discussed themes in this blog, from colonial afterlives to infrastructure projects like the GERD. 

Let's begin by considering Sudan's classical geography. If any physical entity can be said to dominate the Nile River Basin, it is Sudan, the basin's largest country and the site where the Blue and White Nile converge to form the main Nile. Accordingly, Sudan has a high dependence on the Nile as the main water source for its population. However, despite this geographic advantage, historically Sudan has been restricted in its ability to utilize the Nile for various reasons. As discussed in my earlier post focused on untangling colonial links to water management, Sudan's colonial history is crucial to understanding its current state (Botman, 1991). The brief summary here is that water treaties signed on behalf of Sudan by Britain (particularly the treaty of 1929 which pledged Sudan's 'unconditional' support for Egypt's water rights) put them at a serious disadvantage; just a single example of how Britain's colonial motives, which centered on reaping capital for Britain at the detriment of its colonies and people, created generations of poverty and instability (Dawisheh, 2021). Following independence, the first water usage agreement signed by Sudan in 1959, afforded Sudan merely one-third of the water share allotted to Egypt (Arsano & Tamrat, 2005). From the beginning the Sudanese were locked out of the Nile. 

In the decades since, key factors have emerged that have critically reduced Egypt's hegemonic control over the basin and allowed power and leverage to float upstream. Darwisheh (2021) summarizes three key reasons for the shift:

1. Decline of Egyptian power both culturally and materially
2. Egyptian dependence on oil-rich Gulf states which has consequentially increased their stake and power within the basin
3. The decline of Egypt's hydrological veto power over construction projects (such as the GERD) which has sparked new dynamics between upstream, midstream, and downstream riparians

The decline of Egypt has been Sudan's gain. As Egypt's grip on the basin loosens, new opportunities shape across the region for rapidly developing states to fill the power void. Unfortunately, a detailed summary of Sudan's history and economic development over the last few decades exceeds the scope of this post (although I will try and dissect some internal conflicts particularly around the Ethiopian and Sudanese border in the next post).