Egyptian hydro-hegemony: King of the Basin? (6)

"The Nile is a question of life, a matter of existence for Egypt." 

—President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisa (addressing the United Nations September 2019)

Egypt at the height of the Arab Spring (Source: The Times)

In last week's post, I outlined how power has been shifting upstream as of late threatening Egypt's ancient, hegemonic hold on the Nile. In the course of this blog we have thus far covered some domestic political trends in Ethiopia and Sudan, and so my intention in this post is to focus in on Egypt and conceptualize the state's changing role in the Basin. What does the future hold for the Nile River Basin's wealthiest and most powerful riparian? 

Before we begin honing in on Egypt's decline, let's consider the factors that allowed Egypt to establish hydro-hegemony in the first place. Zeitoun & Warner (2006) created a conceptual framework that argues that control of water relies on three key factors: 

1. Geography or riparian position (downstream, midstream, upstream)
2. Hard power (military strength)
3. Material power (infrastructural, economic, and technical ability to utilize water, eg GERD)

Note: Zeitoun and Cascao (2013) later revised this framework to "geography; material power; bargaining power; and ideational power"

Let's apply these facets to Egypt. In the Nile basin, Egypt finds itself downstream, the least favorable geographic location. The Nile must flow into Egypt through Sudan while its headwaters originate further upstream particularly in Ethiopia. However, despite an unfavorable geographic location, Egypt has been able to overcome its disadvantage by a large military, technological, and economic superiority over its southern neighbors. A textbook example of this advantage is in Egypt's construction of the Aswan High Dam (completed in 1970) which until recently provided Egypt the ability to regulate the flow and discharge of the Nile better than any other basin state. While Egypt could theoretically deploy its military power to protect its water security, political conditions along with limited technological development in central and east African states has made such action largely superfluous. Egypt's water security has benefited from the political instability of its neighbors, which in turn reduces their material power and wards off international support for economic development. So what has changed?

A long-time assumption in the Nile River Basin was that Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile, was far too embroiled in internal conflict to pursue any meaningful technical development to pose a threat to Egyptian water security. Egypt further protected its interests by exerting geopolitical weight to discourage international stakeholders from investing in Ethiopian infrastructural projects (Verhoeven, 2015). However, technical advances have occurred over time in Ethiopia in tandem with urbanization and rapid population growth creating both a will and a way for the upstream state to begin shaping the future of the Nile. 

Further, Sudan, which as discussed previously has been a strong ally to Egypt (coerced in many ways by Egypt and Sudan's peculiar sociopolitical relationship) has developed its own capacity to make withdrawals to supply its vast farmlands with water, tempting the state to alter the flow of the Nile for itself. Egypt has controlled the Nile by controlling Sudan. So long as Sudan unconditionally acquiesces to Egypt's "historic rights" to the Nile, Egyptian control is largely secure. However, since the secession of oil-rich South Sudan, Sudan has looked toward progressing into an agricultural power to replace lost oil revenue. Such a goal would require water, much more than Egypt will provide.

Internal turmoil in Egypt (see photo above) from 2011 uprising to the 2013 coup, and the rising power of upstream states like Ethiopia, has allowed Sudan to withdraw from its previous alliance with Egypt. Will negotiation and cooperation prevail in delivering a new hydropolitical order or will states continue to undercut each other in order to meet their own objectives?